tv After Words CSPAN April 6, 2014 11:00am-12:01pm EDT
you've written this book we are going to discuss today. the four-week event about, i would like to start with who you are. we've met at conferences and talk programs. i don't know much about your background and i would guess others do as well. how did you come to the subject? >> guest: thank you for being my chat companion today on
c-span. 24 years ago this year. i was in public politics and i published the books in arabic. my american journey in academia in 1991 at florida atlantic university. in the 90s i published articles. to get the tenure. it was only after 9/11 that i moved to washington. and then the one that preceded this book that actually this book is volume two of the coming revolution. i published it in 2010 and that both predict it are projected
that there will be riots and civil society and eventually they would be sort of a civil war or race between islamists on the one hand insect is on the other hand. and i published this book to try to analyze the evolution of people in the middle east and projection. let me also add that i do advise members of u.s. congress and members of the european parliament who have formed a joint caucus called the transatlantic parliamentary group on counterterrorism. >> that's a very busy and distinguished professional resume. let me try and get a little more and add your mind. what led you to leave lebanon and go to the united states? >> i did not want to leave lebanon. i was teaching. as in politics. i was also a publisher of a
magazine caught masher at international, which was focusing on precisely what became the arab spring. that was 25, 26 years ago. they focused on the future of minorities, prosecutions of minorities. after that, but also democratic movement. in 1990 that was a major event. that convinced me i cannot continue with the work in beirut. they had a very relative calm. then the steering army invaded lebanon in the choice is simple. stay in beirut and have a strong freedom worthy of the united states. at many other personal reasons to come here, pursue a phd and i was offered a job in florida and that's how i became american. >> this year may have a habit not 75. what happened in 1990 that make you feel you needed to leave?
>> and 75, 76 they controlled lebanon. they did not succumb to syrians. so i stayed there as long as there is a piece of land that was free. many lebanese fled from day one. i stayed throughout the 15 year support. but definitely having been in public speech, having opposed the opposition, having published books i minorities in freedom and democracy, they would not of been a choice. if i wanted to continue to write. i had a dream to get an american phd and teach here. so both came together. >> banks. now we begin by having some sense of where you are coming from both geographically and intellectually. so you start up this book with quite bald assertion saying the outcome of the u.s. policies
since 9/11 has been the inverse of what the policies were intended to do or proclaim to do that al qaeda has grown immeasurably and we are witnessing the rise of not only islamists, bissell offers come discriminating the most extreme form of this pompous. for season regime. do you want to defend their? explain it, elaborate? >> guest: this is one of the cornerstones of the book. we have been very optimistic view and rebels, many of the various, raffles, and the changes happening. it looks like eastern europe that it is not. but then you have the entire arab spring is only about the
islamists and nothing could be done in the middle east. in my book i make the case that it is neither one nor the other. this both at the same time. so for 9/11 and till 2011, that decade had gigantic efforts in the region. i mean, we removed the taliban. we removed saddam hussein. rekeyed space in those two spots for societies to emerge and to play the game of democracies. many in washington for cad at the next two peaceful nonviolent resolutions that it failed were impressed by what was happening in afghanistan were in the parliament in iraq was not only the baath party, but many political parties. that is how democracies begin. so why make the case in this book that the arab spring was influenced by two precedence. one was the revolution of lebanon.
1.5 -- 1.8 million people gross against the syrian occupation. it was not entirely successful because hezbollah's weapons remain in the green revolution in iran in june 2009 that also try to rise against. now, the arab spring had its own experiment and to answer your question, she hot is to have been removed from afghanistan, al qaeda in particular have re-created hugs all of the region. they are back in iraq in the sunni triangle. they are growing in yemen, in somalia. i won't even begin with opera seria where they have also expanded into lebanon. each is fighting them. statistically speaking, at one point we may have taken out how lucky, but this is the generation of the ancestors of al qaeda. now talk about the third
generation. >> apart from al qaeda is that your point the islamists are winning in the region. certainly they were winning for a time, but then there's been pushback. what is the pushback in egypt and tunisia. what is your sense of the state of play now? >> guest: absolutely. we are in a delayed understanding of what would happen. when we want the islamists are winning, mr. dancers were no the rebels are winning. now in reclaiming asia and tunisia and other parts assemblers are rising. they say the islamists are in control. but it's actually happiness or race. the islamists and she hot is her dating whatever they can.
they are now flanked by the secularists of egypt went 33 million egyptians marched on june the 30th. not just the largest demonstration of egypt in the issues of demonstrations. this is because the silent majority has shifted. you had on the one edge muslim societies a large slice of islamists and she hot us, which would grow. on the other side you have liberals, and then you have on the top the regime, any regime with america or against america. but was not moving us is the case in eastern and central europe are a lot america was the silent majority. millions and millions of people who watch and onto the site. but egypt has done not in the first resolution revolution, but an effective revolution revolution the site majority move shows the liberal example.
it shows the secular example with the islamic. that is not yet the full success of democracy because democracy needs a revolt against dictatorship against mubarak and against more seed, a radical islamic dictator. not a challenge in egypt is to challenge but happy and in so is the case and tunisia today new political parties. only new political parties can reorganize democracy and allow political parties to function normally. >> let's stick with egypt for a few minutes because i was struck to some of the things you say in the book about egypt. one of those is to say something to the effect that the arab spring is back on track in egypt. back on track is that your exact word, but finally we have it and egypt is in effect on the path to democracy.
a lot of other people, including the egyptians i know look at what's going on in saying what happening is the military is back in power. no democracy in democracies have been put on the back burner or in the closet or something like that. your take seems to be very different. >> guest: it is very different because when we were printing facebook and the debate and all those who triggered the early waves of january 2011, disable critics were saying no, the reformers are the muslim brotherhood and the opposition in mubarak is our friend, so we need to calibrate. what we need to do is read what egyptians -- >> women are not a minority. >> women and minorities. you're right.
from the american perspective that women are minority which is not true. you're right. sit egypt now has discovered the majority that doesn't want any more totalitarian regime. by the military are in power, i am can tending in the next month that despite all of what the military will try to do, maybe they will be elected as president and mrs. a major change. there is a constant majority now that would go back if another attempt will come back. for example, many programs are arresting including members of muslim brotherhood, but liberal groups. they go back to the muslim brotherhood. the egyptians will tell you we don't pop mubarak.
we don't want morrissey and anybody who comes will have to follow a trend towards democracy. now they are in a transitional democracy, democratic past. this revolt was done against the muslim brotherhood is not going to produce immediately the democracy. the choice of the egyptians have either the password islamization as they call it on entrance tabor there will be access criticized as the rest of these individuals so that will support the process and put pressure on the government to stop these arrests. you cannot reverse it and go back. that would be my view. >> i certainly find i share your sense of alarm or a good at the
past egypt was on. i felt that if the muslim brotherhood its grip on egypt. the egyptians or anything else will be democratic. right now -- i guess i'm a little bit less optimistic than you are what egypt is going. i note -- i am not convinced that you can create a democracy on the basis of the mass of people will go to tahirir square every time there is a deviation. that would be there is so ending exhaustion. people won't keep doing it or else at some point you just have
chaos if it's ruled from tahirir square. so what besides the ever present threat that if the new regime becomes the people go back to tahirir square, do you see other structural forces there that are going to push this in a democratic direction? >> that is actually the question of the day that the book is trying to answer, may not have answered fully because it's another book. the book is saying as he just argued, getting rid of what the brotherhood was trying to establish is the biggest that very because had they been able to do it, would've been very dangerous. no civilian or secular regime, even the moderate sunni leadership. so this is how i see a pair from a liberal democratic is, from
america, sweden, it's still behind. egypt today would be comparable to what latin americans struggling democracies on their path to the file word, but away from the military regime existed before and now hopefully what is in venezuela. in egypt you have several things that the mass participation and big banks sometimes for one day or two days important. anybody that wants to assert the unstoppable power. the judges have demonstrated dozens of judges across egypt have started a role to keep things under the law. you have labor unions for the first time who have shown some determination to maintain the sort of culture. they are now more surrogates.
so what is happening now is sort of a dove under which political forces are moving forward. it is not yet -- egypt is not even greece yet for southern italy or spain, which are still struggling with in the midwest. so from the western good, we cannot judge from a perspective. i think there will be crisis. even between how much they'll keep islam are not keep islam and the constitution, there will still be a lot of debate. i am as an historian trying to say egypt went for a very difficult time well. now i can go out with the democracy forces by no means the end of the process. >> i want to stay with egypt for a few more minutes. you say in the book you make a
recommendation for u.s. and western policy towards egypt now, which is in keeping very much at odds with what is our policy right now and with the prevailing wisdom is among most people who comment on the u.s. policy towards egypt. you say that we ought to step up aid and embraced egypt more warmly than in the past. >> absolutely. i am firm on this issue because i'm afraid if we don't think egypt is going to go into populism. but the strong leader, more influence. they're going to talk to other leadership in the world by the military delegation government. so if we go, now and for this new partnership, the new partnership should not be the
old partnership with the government regime. we had it with mubarak. then we had it with morrissey in morrissey was using our partnership to create an islamist base. so now we do offend people to people. it's trying to divert some of this aid to the sector of civil society in each activity may not have to do it from u.s. government to people, but from the american people and multiple ways to do that. congress should do a lot of calibrating. egyptians should also do a lot. my advice is we're not clear that both because the book is addressed to american leaders. they need to send many english speakers. others should be here because this is the egypt america does not know. in terms of public policy in what they want.
even the cops to come and visit around churches here because that's 10%, 12% of the population. and for a strong engagement to retain back to countries that want to be stable and move forward. that is one thing that egypt now seems to be emerging as a leader for a larger block of moderate countries. saudi, bahrain, uae, jordan in terms of pushing back against the brotherhood, being concerned about iran. so if you want a smaller policy, despite all the problems that exist in egypt, now is the time to bring them in. >> when you talk about aid to civil society in egypt, with one of the difficulties has been that the egyptian government under mubarak and more see and i
don't know that it's changed has been extremely difficult to deal with on this particular point. egypt has never been among the most repressive dictatorships. it is just kind of middle of the pack dictatorship. but on the point of allowing foreign aid to civil society, they were one of the most recalcitrant and have been straight through. right now there are american ngos whose staff, including freedom house, national democratic institute were tried and convicted in egypt simply for channeling funds to civil society. did you see a way of coping with that are getting around that? that is our ngos there. we should be very firm in the
egyptian authorities found the next egyptian parliament to be elected. to stop the prosecution of the fallen ngos. on one hand we need to be firm. on the other hand you listen to the arguments of the egyptian spy with a angry with ngos? one of the answers as most of the people who make trained were muslim brotherhood in the sense that you see now the litigations are coming to washington are basically shoveled and basically gone by many ngos and white other organizations and ngos come to washington. unfortunately we thought by partnering with the muslim brotherhood that this is the opposition did this as an academic mistake made in
washington. before the reform the ideology. for people to people, there is a window now because egypt is fighting a huge battle against radical networks. uprising against the valley of the nile. so not any aid coming straight to villages or cities in the good of housing civil society, i don't think the next government to be elected in the next parliament if we do at the right way will object to that. we can rectify this ngos should negotiate their return and there's a work in. >> host: walid, i have to quarrel with you a little bit. they may save you to check government and the people of the u.s. ngos for partnering with in egypt were primarily
islamists are brotherhood people. when i say it, they are lying. it's not true. truth and not very tasty and, full disclosure i'm a member of the board of one of these organizations. i'm pretty well acquainted with his work at night to know the egyptian staff members of freedom house who were arrested and convicted had some unfair are, in absentia. none of them i saw mass or pro-islam is. i think the proof there is that the indictment said these ngos came still under mubarak regime, that the prosecution will
continue. the real reason for the prosecution must be ngos are working with the islamists, then somehow the morrissey administration would have allowed -- >> i agree with you that the intention and leadership at the ngos not to back the muslim brotherhood and the staff is underground may have known better than i do think that is not what i intended to say. the groups that we train, most of the groups that we trained pious as ngos that they were formed by members of the muslim brotherhood. the result at the end of the day is what the egyptian side is saying. more seeds government was smart. they're pushing against the judges. it is very short one year. on the one hand i agree with you that our ngos should be back. i defended them and intervene
with that. but there should be smarter in the ways of engaging those forces. i have been nesting on many meanings with european ngos and the experts and the people engaged. >> why didn't we see that? not knowing the entire series of facts. >> let me continue -- but they take this to another area because i really felt i won with you in terms of your straw fear
and dislike of the brotherhood in disbelief of those who say that they are just moderates they are somehow the equivalent of the christian democrats in europe. i don't believe and i follow you and miss that the democrats of any kind and i have a completely different agenda. i am on the same plane with you. but i was surprised in the book and how far you go in making the accusation that u.s. policy was pro-brotherhood or pro-islam as. it seemed to me accommodated to some extent, but i didn't think the islamists -- it didn't appear to need the islamists were the ones that the u.s. was favoring. if you argue repeatedly in the book that in fact we were favoring islam's. >> guest: i do. i have a lot of evidence, but i
also have statements by people who try to knock on the doors of the state department or other agencies to partner. i mean, my argument was that not islamist forces and ngos have tried so hard to partner or engage with the u.s. government only to find that the ngos, our government institutions in the opposition. i'm not excluding the democrats have been advised by expertise that this is the viable for is that we need to do business with and that the brotherhood eventually -- the good intention and washington is thinking the brotherhood will reform. we go back to argument number one. many rumors and talents they would love the islamists. no, we don't want them to start the islamist state. we were left to believe by academia and expertise that they
will reform and the whole point of if it did not reform. they're using an entrance strategy, which led us to believe we can partner with them at the exclusion of the other side. so my point is not that we knew they were, what they were doing and we helped them. we did know how far they motivated that we partnered with them. that would be my real argument. >> the thing that struck me most in the book is being way out there was when you said that the obama administration embraced the demonstrations against mubarak to the extent that we are breaking now. we are going to take a quick break. i will take up the questions when we come back.
>> i was challenging you on your claims about how the degree to which the obama administration actually favored or supported the brotherhood. that may read one sentence here, which i thought was strong. stronger than i would have said or believed. the obama administration so carefully with the events in tahrir square. talking about 2011. it increased pressure on mubarak only in proportion to the growth of the muslim brotherhood
participation. >> absolutely. this is the strong point and make on purpose because i was following not just a after day, that hour after hour. i am not charging the entire administration because when we use that term, it means that everybody from dod to the state to the white house understood these archives and we need to help them. i am making a statement that those who gave the actual advice went to ask mubarak to go down actually favored the idea that the brotherhood. it basically began 85,000 -- that's the beginning of the resolution. very saddlers. 30 or 40,000 members at the facebook came down. the original two rear squarer will use a postfix and others.
everybody knows in the arab world that the brotherhood said it, we stayed behind. they were afraid of the regime. they didn't know how it's going to end up. they didn't know if the obama administration the west in general would allow them to question. it's only when the umbrella was provided to the demonstrators, second day, third day, for a day when was brought broadly by washington, do not go. this is the beginning of the collapse of the mubarak regime. then as if it was courtney did have the brotherhood coordinated themselves and our international media. it was in the brotherhood we ever had at the state and the white house changed. we want to see how we are going to solve this issue between the government and the protesters in the first 72 hours because we are still out. when the brotherhood within and the speeches by zardari became
central, then mr. mubarak should resign. the >> i'd give you a different way to interpret it because the implication, tell me if i'm wrong, but i think you just reaffirmed the implication in the look and i think what you said is because the brotherhood chimed in in the u.s. administration had a favorable attitude towards the brotherhood , then our administration decided to go further in saint mubarak, you must go with support them. so, it sounds as if our favorable attitude towards the brotherhood is what allowed us to go further towards mubarak. but at alternative explanation of the sequence, and i don't disagree with your description of the secrets, but another way
to look at it with the demonstration began with secular young people, of liberal minded and there have been many previous demonstrations as you know so well, that they were always tiny. the small group would come out and suddenly there were tens of thousands. later more, but tens of thousands needed a watershed of nature meant this change. said he different is going on. and then there were a few days later hundreds of thousands. the muslim brotherhood was very cautious or kg and they have first didn't stick their necks out. but when they saw that there were hundreds of thousands of grassroots egyptians going into the square, then they put up the word to their cadres to the van. but i would say -- another way
of looking at the sequence you've described is the same observation that moved the brotherhood to move in all sale is what moved the obama administration. so it was said that the brotherhood moved in that changed the obama administration line to mubarak, but the explosive growth of the protest affected on the one hand the brotherhood in on the other hand the u.s. administration. they were both drawn to a different position. >> we can expand from a different day. if were talking about the game changer, there's tens of thousands took to two rear squarer peer 50s, 60s, 100,000. it was the narrative that the administration between our ally, mr. mubarak and these people.
if they wanted to actually have these people, they rate go down. i'm asking the question, i think the brotherhood did not really change the nature of the demonstration. the brotherhood came in. that's why my criticism is that the administration was badly advised in the sense that only when the brotherhood poco would, you will let go of mubarak because it may have been paid attention that they want to know also that the islamists are going to do. there's always this concern because there is no trust in the actual civil society. so there could be many interpretation. yours as well. >> i want to raise one other point about u.s. political dynamics. it's another point where i found your assertions in the book to be stronger than i would make banana leaves the u.s. behind
and go back to the region because i want to touch on some other countries. one other point about u.s. politics right on your assertions very strong senior care rescission of the influence of what you call the islamist lobby, which i think is a very fair turn and i'm glad you put it on the table. where you scratch my head a little and said she, i wonder if it is as bad as that. there's one point in of which you have dominant influence in u.s. policy. we've had maybe not a rash of books, but a series of books that claim u.s. policy is dominated by the jewish lobby, israel lobby, zionist lobby and i have found them all wildly
unconvincing. you seem to be pregame the polar opposite accusation that there is an islamist lobby. perhaps with all the noise about israel, jewish lobby, it is very salutary for someone to raise the question of the islamist lobby. but is it really a dominant force in u.s. decision-making? >> i haven't felt a course on how ford policy pressures groups. we don't even call them lobbies, that's what they do. that is what every group does for a particular cause. you're talking about the big ones, the ones that have been criticized an islamist lobby. there's a medium i become lobby if they have specific entries. people have pressure groups.
i remember from my days in the 90s they want syria to get out. but there is a difference between conspiracy view of lobbies and control of government, which of course i opposed any lobby that for a pressure group focuses on their own way in this case the islamist lobby of why we do this interview today versus weeks ago because that is not me. how far to ask other than saudi arabia and i read when they criticized qatar. when in connection with the muslim brotherhood that they have funded for years one of the largest lobby to influence the government. no one would accuse others of having a lobby. not because of what happened in egypt, it is coming from the
inside. funds have been invested in america to obtain influence. i don't if this is outside the american equation. my point is that national security foreign policy should have listened to many more views on the middle east, not just the views of our academia and a very clear on this one in the previous book that is good funded in middle eastern studies. when they come to be invested here, if they go to agrarian studies, but may target middle eastern studies and enforce one of few, we haven't seen a lot of research in american academia about sudan and southern sudan. we have not had significant research on lebanon. while we have a lot of stuff on the arab-israeli conflict, all
of that indicates it should be a better balance in how we advise on foreign policy. and i do claim there is a significant pressure group that focuses on one of you. in the arab-israeli conflict, everybody does aipac and all the jewish american organizations do. but it is not that these groups exist. they should listen to more than one with nato at the arab world in general. the arab world view has not been shaped also by representatives of minorities, by representatives of arab women, we have not heard a lot to actually get their outcome. >> i want to get back to the region, but one point you
made -- one of the more interesting points it's not about america or the region, as you tackled the subject of islamic phobia. i spend a little time following the u.n. and not this arena in which islamic phobia has been raised and many have been with the islamic phobia. do i speak.? >> guest: i do recognize that islam a phobia exists. if it's an irrational fear of islam and therefore indicative attitude to his community and absolutely against it. the islamic phobia is nothing
than one group. any other foreign phobia is part of it. the brotherhood law via has hijacked the notion and made it into a webpage. anyone who's criticizing a policy issue has nothing to do with religion, having to do with the five pillars. they have been accused of islamic phobia and this is very close to at the national socialists in germany would've accuse anyone criticizing their policies against the german race. even at the international level, this has become very tedious. for example, i provide what islamic phobia is dealing with. number one against anti-islam people. i make a distinction. if people who are anti-islam ground and i'm not one of them, that's a theological debate.
if people debate each other, and very liberal liberal on this one. to date as much as you want. don't have an impact on national security. if you dislike them, these are ideas versus ideas. i cannot come in and regulate how to do theological debate. that is one. second, if people are talking about the history of the region, this is where it becomes serious and people are presenting the minorities in the region are saying well, our history is one of depression. you accuse them of being islamic phobic. you accuse the serious and even shia are not sunni. so we have to reregulate the notion of islamic phobic here at the worst-case effect denies, if you are trying to help the u.s. government in determining what
is the ideology of the two hottest, you got criticized for being an islamist vote. so it's a bit too far. that chart should go back to where it belongs. only those of course for violence that are taken away rights as a community because you don't like the theology or the islamic phobia. but the other side is his illegitimate. >> let me go back to the middle east. the other leading country where there's been some reversal of momentum is tunisia, which is beside the point were the arab spring. it had an election where the islam is didn't win a majority, but they won a plurality and they're able to form a government. but they were thwarted in pushing through the constitution
they wanted and now there's been kind of compromise, consensus constitution. tell me what you think the state of play is in tunisia at this point. >> the islamists are tunisia learned from what happened in egypt. that's the bottom line. that is what is happening in the internal debate and chat rooms and even in the secular analysis and assessment or why not. it's good they are now going to suppress those demonstrations as was the case with mr. morrissey. not his political party. >> the islamic parties took over in tunisia. the narrative is more moderate than the muslim brotherhood. one level of moderation. but tunisia, social constitution as you know a slightly different egypt in the sense that the islamists are smarter politically and the secularists
are stronger. there is a greater role for tunisian women in the secular and eject, for example. in tunisia, the fact the islamic government was not able to stop one of their associates who is not with them, but ideologically linked to them of the fascinating specular leaders. that is that exploited the situation in egypt. the secular movement, which is mostly worker labor and women and youth intended on bringing down the rebellion movement was performing. not enterprise for the french and nice to have a negotiation,
so now there's a new cabinet in tunisia. it is a cease-fire that both sides intend to go back to government. that is going to oblige them to reform eventually and compel the opposition to accept some sort of islamist/, and they be democrat, i don't know if because the experiment has not existed in the arab world. if you are islamist and you become a democrat. that's different. tunisia did better than the model in egypt. >> where do you think it's going now? >> i think reality is both are going to try to come back to power. there is a determination by the secular because the secular saying i speak with the leaders they know where it was going. my conclusion is if they reform
on the inside it may be accepted for the future. if not, they are just doing this is a move that may come back later and they have the same result of the future. >> now, the last polls are going to be elections in tunisia in 2014. the polls i have seen show that the main secular party is pretty substantially ahead. do you -- do you think that is going to stand up right through? >> it reflects what happens over the past few months, meaning what happened in egypt give so much energy to tunisia. they were stopped sort short of
the revolt and that's good. the synergies will come through elections. they most likely are going to form the next government here but this is only the beginning. when they form the next government, they have to hope everybody else make a distinction. she hottest, violent, al qaeda and its allies should reform. so the slogan is helping the islamists to reform. the islamists will perform at the muslim brotherhood and today she will not be lucky. >> so you think there's still a danger that a nod to, which is distinguished from the groups that are geeks if they are and have engaged in violent consistently since 2011. another has been nonviolent. entirely functioning as a
political party. you see a danger they could resort to violence? >> i am observing if not they will move one inch towards reforming itself better than it will survive and become the conservative muslim party of turkey. but there are slices and all the concern about those who are linchpins that could join. i'm not saying make it for us to move tichy heidi direction. now, they will join. >> i mention it before, but in your book you are very foolish on each had and you even have kind of been inspiring sentences may get egypt could become the model of democracy for the region. egypt has always been the pacesetter. it features a mix of a transition to democracy, no one
would disagree that we have a tremendous ramifications around the region and influence on most or all of the countries. tunisia is actually closer, you would agree, to get to the point where you judge it to be democratic and now they have this compromise constitution written, which is a democratic constitution and if the elections go in the secularists for the next government and if you suggest that constitute the role of the the parliamentary opposition rather than something else, some kind of conspiratorial movement, to the show would upset or as the first legitimate democracy in the world.
>> tunisia will be more advanced. even egyptians know that. tunisia assignation, the french model coming back, look at the women in politics. this is the way to act in a labor union. it would be more advanced, but only with egypt will move, even one or two inches, it will impact the entire arab world in my view. >> i take that point, peter anticipated my question. tunisia is further advanced. but we haven't a democracy except lebanon until the serious the cancer that said, which is a 1975 a long time ago and that eventually choke you out. for all these years we've not had a single democracy. tunisia would be number one in the post-lebanon area.
that tunisia is a smaller country. it's closer to the west geographically and culturally. still my question is if tunisia is there is a model democracy, would that have influence on others? >> we now in a country live in the open world, global world. would have been on facebook, for example, you have many egyptians discussing with them in egypt we did this come in tunisia are you doing that. the root has completely changed the times of the lebanon democracies with a couple of newspapers and i was not popular debate. tunisia is going to go fast. egypt will go slower. but they will have to deal with the brotherhood. i have a little bit of good news though. i also copy each other.
they will move to make a direction and influence maybe not to tiredness and rather had, dissenting dissenting to let the missile in egypt. not the entire organization is spent on what they're doing right now. this may influence. we need to see one model for the southern conservatives could have a political party cannot connect to did she hottest, and select team a muslim -- as some conservatives because that's what it is. >> for this image you just given us of an islamist reformed islamist political movement that can play the role of a legitimate political party within a democracy and shared in sustaining that democracy, you
said it needs to not beat she hottest comment but it needs to also really had some long will embrace democratic values and made fit to things and not be conspiratorial internally and embrace democracy as a way that society should function, including full rights for others. you would agree? >> this is the paradigm. you have worked on this as well. this is a generational issue. but if a judge they cannot go in different paths, i encouraged by other signs that will help the reform. they've taken a path i've not seen when it comes to bush adorer but he job with regard to brotherhood. even the saudis in previous
books. there are movements fair to push back against radicalism if there are political parties who will could not with the finches have a chance that can't be confident in the future with the help of the secular with this because the more moderate islamists movement. the next time viewers may not recognize the term. >> a religious university which is recognized as the leading sunni religious university based in cairo. it's the equivalent of the vatican for the catholics for the sunni. >> this idea, this image you presented is one to be wished. are you concerned about the prospects for this kind of democratic islam is an emerging by what we've seen happen in
turkey? >> actually, i am encouraged. i'm discouraged by what was supposed to be whether or not they should be going. >> the ruling party of mr. aragon, which of course is the most advanced. around the world could be a model. they came to power and its effective foreign policy not in the direction we would hope, for example closer to reran, closer to saddam and deterioration of relationship with israel that is not what many had hoped. only when the government started to put pressure, we see the demonstration. why am i saying i am hopeful? that the younger generations in turkey have understood that passionate need to accept the
sun/democrats to refuse any time there is an attempt to take away some of their freedom. so turkey is always moving forward pursuer resistance for pluralism and democracy. >> weary downturn last few seconds. you are closing on hopeful note about the region. do you also feel hopeful about u.s. policy which is so disappointed you to this point? >> it is an issue another philosophy. it is to be more engaging and foreign policy. listen to other advisors. this into an alternative view because we have been warning about anything said it happening. others strongly advised the obama administration and the remainder of their man they would widen the scope of who they're listening to.
>> it's been nice talking to you. hope many people read your book. >> guest: has been great discussing with you. thank you. >> the next three hours is your chance to talk to author and military strategies. the former assistant secretary of defense will talk about counterinsurgency. the wind out of the war in afghanistan and current foreign